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PRESENTATION
ABOUT POWER, AUTHORITY AND SUBJECTION
Power produces subjects, it would be a way to enunciate one of the Foucauldian theses that open 
a critical horizon beyond the scheme of sovereignty, which Judith Butler accurately describes 
when she says “we are accustomed to conceive power as something that exerts pressure on the 
subject from the outside, something that subordinates, underrates and relegates to a lower order 
“(2010, p.12). The representation of power as an external force that imposes itself, as repression 
on the part of a group, an individual or the State, moves, in the Foucauldian analytic, towards a 
theory of subjection, in the double sense of this term, as submission and as subjectivation (Álva-
rez, 2015, Butler, 2010). Thus, the central problem for Foucault would not be the origin, nature 
or legitimation of power but its exercise on others, the particular question posed by Foucault is, 
precisely, “what happens when individuals exercise, as they say, their power over others?” (Álva-
rez, 2015, p. 329). For Foucault the answer to this question is not evident nor immediate, because 
the appearance in the sixteenth century of the State in the Western world (Álvarez, 2015) was 
configured as a cause of the widespread conception of power invested to subdue. Now, distant is 
the French philosopher of ignoring the importance of these analyzes, nonetheless, his reflection 
points to the constitution of the subject as who exercises and on which power is exercised and, 
therefore, the strategies used to it. In an interview with P. Boncennes in 1978, Foucault states the 
following
I do not think that this question “who exerts power?” can be answered unless the question “how does it happen?” is 
answered at the same time. Of course, we have to show who the responsible ones are, we know that we have to resort 
to, let’s say, deputies, ministers, prominent private secretaries, etc. But this is not the important issue, because we know 
perfectly well that even if we were to designate exactly all those people, all those decision-makers, we still would not 
really know why and how the decision is made, how it becomes accepted by all, and how it harms a particular category 
of people, etc. (Álvarez, 2015, p. 92).
This is an interesting way to state the issue, since it is common to ask who exercises power, 
furthermore if who assumes power actually exercises it or if he, himself, is not subdue to another 
whose power is instituted with more severity, force or legitimacy. The Foucauldian theses on 
power are based, in part, on a particular observation: human beings are inevitably constituted 
in the midst of a complex framework of discipline and forms of training, which in one way or 
another has been enhanced by the creation of spaces of confinement in more or less recent dates 
in the history of the Western world, since according to Foucault, the disciplining of societies is 
more systematically evidenced since the eighteenth century. However, his examination of forms 
of training leaded him to the analysis of power relations rather than to an explanation of power 
as a foundation or essence, hence the question posed by the French author of what happens when 
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individuals exert their power over others? is revealed as a sense that points, precisely, to the 
understanding of power in its act dimension. The reflection on power does not lose its value when 
it is considered as a renunciation of freedom in which a right is transferred to a delegate by means 
of consent, for example, rather a theoretical-practical field is opened that conceives relationships 
between subjects that act, and not only between poles of activity and passivity, violence and 
resistance. Specifically for Foucault, power relations operate “on the field of possibility where 
the behavior of acting subjects comes to be inscribed; incites, induces, facilitates or makes more 
difficult, expands or limits, becomes more or less probable; in the extreme, it absolutely obliges 
or prevents “(Álvarez, 2015, p.334). In this regards, in Foucault, the power in its relations will 
have to be thought from the scope of what he calls government, in the sense of the leadership of 
others, and not only in the struggle, violence or voluntary resignation.
The question, what happens when individuals exert their power over others?, triggers a reflec-
tion on the relations of power that we intertwine daily, since, in Foucault, the governing of others 
would not be exclusive of those that could be considered power elites, due to the forms of indoc-
trinating are over time reproduced in institutions and remain there, surely without distinction of 
hierarchy among individuals. This aspect of the power described by Foucault allows, also, an 
ethical pondering on these relationships, in a wider order than the one that concerns only to the 
current ruler, with those who have or feel subordinated to him. Here I refer to an ethical reflec-
tion in the sense that this production of subjectivity, addressed by Foucault, would involve each 
individual in scenarios in which we assume that power is not being exercised or that we believe 
the code or regulation of an institution is only being applied, in both cases we are deceived by 
the idea, taken unilaterally, of power considered only as sovereignty. Thus, this production of 
subjectivity would have its place in the sphere of individual relationships, in the face-to-face 
interaction with others and it would remind us that relations are carried out bilaterally. The Gada-
merian notion of authority is a good example of this, specifically when the German philosopher 
reflects on this matter “in the practical experience of life” (Gadamer, 2002, p. 61). In his analysis 
Gadamer implies how the prescription that delimits fantasy, typical of a socially institutionalized 
world, and the prevalence of certain models “that leave their print onus” (Gadamer, 2002, p. 62) 
for their ability to go beyond our own discourse and leave open a field of new possibilities for 
us, operate in parallel. According to Gadamer, this last sense of authority reveals its productive 
character -concept that should be understood as that that mobilizes, puts into tension, intensi-
fies (Jullien, 2009)–whenever authority distances from authoritarianism, which appeals to the 
formula: “something must be done in a certain way because it has always been done like that, it 
is necessary to adjust to the inveterate way of doing things”, as if that way of doing things disre-
garded any history, only the pressing vision of the present of whom by such formula is oriented 
prevails. Authority, from a Gadamerian perspective, seems to be as such because it stimulates 
fantasy, because instead of being imposed, it is granted. Somebody is summoned up with autho-
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rity, that is, authority would not be the product of a relationship of obedience but of an act of 
acknowledgment. This way, who fails at creating this relationship of authority will have to appeal 
to different imposition strategies -subtle, symbolic, tangible- that seem to bestow what he lacks.
For Gadamer, authority is linked to knowledge since, according to the German philosopher, it 
is difficult to grant authority to what seems irrational, or in more measured words, unwarranted; 
meaning, who is authorized (Gadamer, 2001) does not need to resort to his own authority to be 
recognized as such; in this regards, Gadamer points out: "this is evident in the sense that, for 
various reasons, it cannot be actually stated, how authority is acquired" (2001, p.135); on the 
contrary, the desire to exercise power in an authoritarian manner without any approval is unmis-
takable. This matter is evident in institutions that, by their regulations or forms of constitution, do 
not regularly consider participatory strategies of sovereignty, which up to certain point is unders-
tood as a way of ruling over and among individuals that foster the detriment of the majority, and 
thus in this singular production of subjectivities, the subjects reproduce those forms of privileged 
participation in regimes in which what has not been recognized but only imposed is taken for 
granted. In this sense, Foucauldian reflection on relations of power helps counteract the idea that 
the subject is “passionately attached to his own subordination” (Butler, 2010, p.17), enunciated 
by produced subjects who still see themselves as if they were entirely constituted from their 
origin, and in their present they consider they entitle an authority that they do not really possess 
– again the Gadamerian perspective. Now, it is clear that as individuals belonging to institutions 
that contribute to the education field from different spheres, we have the task of considering 
the relationship authority-knowledge, since the relationships established by current knowledge 
systems produce singular, modeled and trained subjectivities, from which subjects who dange-
rously take knowledge by authority emerge, which means fostering the use of very limited and 
precise strategies as the only legitimate ways of obtaining their authority. In this matter, the reflec-
tion provided by the human sciences is essential, whether their practices, discourses or scientific 
products take -or not–into account this path to reflect on power or its relationships. However, it is 
productive (considering the sense that Jullien gives to the concept) to not dismiss this perspective 
of the historical production of subjectivity as a way to stop and think about our commitment in 
the actions we exert over others.
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